Journal of Emerging Scholarship

Development and welfare policies in countries with high rates of poverty and in wealthier countries are built on the use of incentives, which can cause unpredictability in economists’ models and the inefficient use of aid. Economists and policy-makers, on the one hand, may make policies based on inaccurate assumptions about public response; similarly, the aid recipient can make uninformed choices that are detrimental to their long-term welfare. Through examination of various developing countries, this paper highlights the widespread flaws in this relationship between policy-maker and the public and proposes a framework built on “consultation centers,” enabling data to flow more freely between consultant and consultee. The proposed consultation centers would be a place where complex concepts can be communicated between consultant and the consultee through the use of common references such as currency, time, and difficulty. Examination of Citizens Advice in Scotland and inefficient aid distribution in Anne Arundel County will reveal an opportunity for the implementation of consultation centers here in Maryland. This paper concludes that, in theory, consultation centers promote rationality from consultants and consultees by easing the spread of information, thus creating a more equal relationship between economists and impoverished communities. A side-benefit of the proposed framework would be to return some of the welfare work back to the community level, and perhaps reduce the political polarization about welfare policies based on adverse incentives for impoverished communities.